US-India relations aren’t as abysmal as they seem

I’ve read that the Indian commentariat and foreign policy establishment are more wary of the United States than at any time this century.

Maybe so. But 26 years is not a particularly long time, and it often seems that there’s a “manic” aspect on the Indian side when considering the bilateral relationship.

Perhaps people get a little too excited when things are going well, and a little too depressed when the occasional hiccups happen. But is the India-US relationship really off track? Even if it’s currently in a “down” moment, look back 40 years, and things still look pretty good. Here are a few things to consider:

First, the US ambassador to India is a lot better than his predecessor. Ambassador Sergio Gor chose India out of any number of possible postings — or positions within the Trump administration. He’s not in India for a three-year holiday. Even more, Ambassador Gor can call the White House and President Trump will answer. Very few ambassadors can do this.

Second, it’s not as if the US has forgotten about India or is giving it the cold shoulder. Notice Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited last month. He didn’t choose India at random.

And Rubio is not only the most consequential Secretary of State since George Schultz, but he’s also the National Security Advisor. His visit is a gauge of the importance the Trump administration assigns to India.

Third, the India-US military-to-military prelateship is stronger than ever. The two forces conduct frequent exercises, India has become a maintenance and logistics hub for the US Navy and arms sales are robust.

India also gets a degree of special treatment regarding technology exports — although there is room for improvement.

As for trade? A bilateral trade deal is in the works, which might assuage the shock felt by many countries of having blanket tariffs imposed on them.

Yes, it would have been nice if tariffs had been applied more carefully, but the Trump administration was dealing with a problem that had built up over many decades, and felt a sledgehammer was needed to shift things in the right direction.

India’s resentment is understandable, but it’s not unique. Indeed, Japan could feel even more aggrieved — given its 70 years as a loyal treaty ally and the deep military and economic ties with America — and the consistent political support it has provided.

Instead, Tokyo bit its tongue, ensuring that resentment didn’t get the better of strategic interests. “Biting one’s tongue” is perhaps sometimes the better part of statesmanship —provided one reckons the relationship is valuable enough.

And at the end of the day, Indian and American strategic interests align — as the world enters a struggle between free, consensually governed nations and expansionist totalitarian ones.

Yes, it’s China that I’m mostly talking about. India, in fact, recognized the “China threat” far earlier than did the US, which has belatedly woken up. Regardless, by their very existence, India and the United States are a rebuttal of China’s dictatorship and repression.

However, from some Indian quarters its claimed Trump doesn’t see China as a threat and is aiming to “sell out” to Beijing.

Trump’s maneuvering room is constrained by US dependence on China for critical minerals, pharmaceuticals and manufactured goods. But the president has no illusions about the People’s Republic of China as a rival, if not an enemy, and Xi Jinping is clearly unhappy about US policies towards the PRC.

But isn’t Trump “transactional”— as often said as an insult? I should hope so. And Trump isn’t unique in this regard.

Every president, and one might suggest every world leader, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is “transactional.” They all expect some benefit for whatever they do, and their citizens do as well.

What about the US and Pakistan?

I understand why India is irked — though this issue has existed in the India-US relationship for many years, even while it improved over the last couple of decades.

The Pakistanis played a double game against the United States from the beginning of its time in Afghanistan. And Pakistan is too close to China for comfort, and indeed is effectively a PRC proxy state.

Even more, the evidence is conclusive that Pakistan has and does sponsor and direct terrorism against India. Perhaps keep in mind that while it’s not a perfect comparison, in some respects India’s ties with Russia are similarly exasperating to the United States.

Is the US challenging India’s ‘strategic autonomy’?

This expression is used a lot, and all nations want to have “strategic autonomy”, but sometimes it seems more an excuse for India to avoid doing anything it doesn’t want to do — even if it should do it.

The Japanese use “the Constitution” in a similar fashion to beg off complying with US requests when it suits themselves.

A few suggestions

Make yourself “useful” — and distinguish yourself from the crowd.

Do this no matter who is in the White House. Trump is just more likely than his predecessors to openly ask what a particular country has done for the US.

India already has one huge selling point for the Trump administration: It is serious about its defense and is willing to fight — indeed, it is fighting — to defend itself.

This is almost a litmus test with the Trump administration and India has passed it. Few other countries have. Remind the Americans of this — repeatedly.

India might also help out in the Indian Ocean. The US is finally paying closer attention to the region, having woken up in recent months when the British attempted to hand over Diego Garcia and its strategic military base (America’s only one in the region) to Mauritius.

The US has few good options from a basing and access perspective in the region. Give it some. India might even get the Americans to pay for it, including Indian port refurbishments.

And keep the Quad going. This writer doesn’t believe that head-of-state Quad meetings are essential. Rather, solid continuous ties at lower and working levels and actually accomplishing things matter more than get-togethers between the Quad’s top dogs.

India’s recent agreement with Australia on maritime security is a good one, as are deepening Indian defense ties with Japan. Not everything has to be a “four-way” effort. Perhaps consider moving ahead with increased Quad use of the Andaman Islands for maritime patrol and security, and anti-submarine warfare operations.

The Americans would also appreciate India’s help in the Pacific Islands that are currently facing sustained Chinese political warfare. India can make useful contributions in areas such as medical, tourism, education, scholarships and investment.

And help the US break the Chinese stranglehold on rare earth minerals and pharmaceuticals, while diversifying energy sources. In other words, buy more US oil and gas — and less from Russia.

If you want to get noticed by the Trump administration, explain yourself — and not just to the DC think-tank crowd. Have the ambassador and his staff regularly head out to “flyover country” outside Washington and explain why India matters to Americans.

This advice applies just as much to more longstanding allies such as Japan, Great Briain, and Australia, though they seldom follow it.

A few final notes

This piece is written as a US perspective of what India ought to do to improve the India-US relationship. This is, of course, a two-way street.

The writer believes most Indians in the commentariat and official class can rattle off a dozen things America must do to fix the relationship. The American side’s perspective may not get heard so often.

And some final advice to any foreigner (and even other Americans) when it comes to Trump: Always remember that Trump is a New Yorker, on top of being a real estate man.

I am from Virginia. And even we have to brace ourselves when dealing with New Yorkers. Grow an extra layer of skin. It’s nothing personal on their part. Remember this and you can avoid getting wrapped up in resentments — even if not entirely avoiding them.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He was the first Marine liaison officer to the Japan Self Defense Force, and is a fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. He is the author of the book, “When China Attacks: A Warning To America.”

This article first appeared on The Sunday Guardian and is republished here with the author’s kind permission. (Asia Times)